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Abstract: This review surveys recent research developed in behavioral economics on the 
determinants of unethical behavior. Most recent progress has been made in three directions: 
the understanding of the importance of moral norms in individual decision-making, the 
conflicting role of opportunities provided by asymmetries of information and social 
preferences, and the crucial effect of rules, occupational norms and incentive schemes in the 
diffusion of dishonesty. The connection between economics and psychology is the most vivid 
on the first dimension. 
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Introduction 
 
For decades, economists have analyzed dishonesty using the economics-of-crime approach of 
Becker (1968) [1]. Its main prediction is that rational individuals decide to commit a crime if 
the marginal benefits deriving from the dishonest action exceed its marginal costs, e.g. caused 
by expected punishment. Since the seventies numerous studies on tax evasion or corruption 
have shown that, indeed, people are reactive to variations in income, tax rates, probability of 
detection and level of sanctions. But they also repeatedly noticed that individuals cheat much 
less than what would be required by the maximization of income, emphasizing that 
compliance decisions should not be considered as pure gambles. It is more recently that 
economists have investigated the behavioral determinants of dishonesty. This topic is one of 
those where the dialogue between economists and psychologists is today the most active (see, 
for example, the 2013 special issue on deception of the Journal of Economic Behavior & 
Organization) [2]. 
In this note, we present recent economic research on dishonesty along three main lines, from 
the more to the less connected with psychology. We start with the analysis of individual 
ethical behavior and moral preferences, where the preoccupations of psychologists and 
economists meet the most closely. Then, we introduce research on dishonesty with strategic 
interactions and social preferences, where the specificity of economists is the focus on 
asymmetries of information and externalities of individual behavior on others’ wellbeing. 
Finally, we present the analysis of the impact of institutions, rules and incentives on unethical 
behavior. This final set of results is especially relevant to economists since their interest for 
the determinants of dishonesty is partly motivated by the willingness to design more efficient 
policies. Note the contrast with previous surveys on dishonesty (see notably [3]), because we 
mainly consider papers published since 2012 and we do not discriminate between 
methodological aspects. We primarily focus on deceptive behavior and only marginally 
discuss other behavioral ethics topics like altruism, reciprocity, justice and fairness. 
 
Ethical behavior and moral preferences in non-strategic environments 
 
In the traditional economics-of-crime framework, individuals facing similar economic 
conditions should only vary in their decision to lie because of different risk attitudes. 
However, inspired by psychology, recent behavioral economics research has delivered two 
major sets of results that can hardly be rationalized within the standard framework. 
First, even when there is no risk of detection and no sanction there is a huge 
heterogeneity in the individuals’ decision to act dishonestly. Using a representative sample of 
the population, an experiment in which people could earn money by reporting on the phone 
the outcome of a coin toss has revealed almost no difference between the distribution of 
reports and the distribution of fair tosses, suggesting that people have high moral lying costs 
[4]. This was particularly true when the reporting decision was taken after a relative extensive 
interaction period as it was implemented in this study between the interviewer and the subject. 
The fact that not all people lie to maximize their earnings has been observed in adults but also 
to a much smaller extent in children [5,6], suggesting that it needs time to learn and 
progressively internalize moral norms.  
Heterogeneity of decisions indicates that individuals differ in their preferences. In [7], 
Gibson, Tanner and Wagner contrast a type-based model in which individuals’ type is either 
economic or ethical and an approach of consequentialists (who care only about outcomes) and 
non-consequentialists (who – irrespective of the consequences – feel resistance to engage in 
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actions that would violate moral values, e.g. who feel a pure lying aversion [8]). The observed 
decrease of the lying rate with higher truthfulness costs is inconsistent with a bipolar type-
based model and suggests instead a continuum of preferences for truthfulness. For a given 
monetary cost of honesty, variations in behavior capture between-subject heterogeneity in 
moral costs. The non-separability between intrinsic and extrinsic costs reveals that 
heterogeneity exists also within individuals. This within-individual heterogeneity could 
explain that similar experiments deliver conflicting results, for example, on gender effects: 
recent evidence [9,10] fails replicating the higher males’ propensity to deceive found in [11]. 
Lying, nevertheless, seems to be more pronounced in male and mixed groups compared to 
female groups [12].   
The second set of results that contradicts the standard economic model is the evidence of 
incomplete dishonesty, suggesting non linearities in moral costs. An important contribution 
has been made in [13] by Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi who ask subjects to report the 
outcome of a die roll in order to determine payoffs. Besides a fraction of subjects who report 
truthfully and a fraction who maximize earnings by lying in full, a majority of people cheat 
but incompletely, and this is robust to several manipulations. Similar results have been found 
under reinforced privacy, using the dice-under-the-cup paradigm [14]. In a task involving 
counting various types of coins, a small theft rate of 10% did also not change when 
monitoring of a different dimension - in this case quality of the work – was introduced [15]. 
In line with [16], partial cheating can be explained by the willingness of people to exploit 
earnings opportunities while maintaining their self-concept of honesty. Most people value 
appearing moral: they cheat up to the threshold above which they would have to admit they 
are dishonest. Interestingly, people may sometimes lie even disadvantageously to appear 
honest, as in an experiment conducted with nuns [17]. 
However, individuals can manipulate their moral firmness, consciously or unconsciously. 
Both psychologists and economists analyze which self-serving strategies people use to 
manage self-image and reduce the moral cost of lying. Individuals create self-justification to 
lie, by managing attention or reframing the decision problem [14,18,19,20]. They engage in 
moral balancing, by behaving more generously after cheating [21,22]. Self-serving 
rationalizations also include focusing on the benefits one’s lie causes to others [23,24]. 
 
Lying, social preferences and strategic interactions 
 
Dishonest actions go rarely without social consequences. They usually generate positive or 
negative externalities on others’ well-being through social interactions. Therefore, social 
preferences (such as fairness, inequality aversion, efficiency or social image concerns) are 
expected to interact with deceptive behavior. People with social preferences misbehave or not, 
depending both on the harm or benefit a lie causes to others, and on the weight they put on 
others’ utility in their own utility function. This relationship is complex. On the one hand, as 
shown by Gneezy in [25], there is heterogeneity in the willingness to lie when a lie hurts 
others [26]. People dislike not keeping their promises and guilt aversion prevents deception 
[27,28]. This may explain that people are more willing to lie about information they hold than 
about their actions [29]. It has also been shown that social image concerns and shame increase 
taxpayers’ compliance when detected evasion is publicly exposed [30,31]. On the other hand, 
people can ignore the consequences of their lie when it is easy to pretend not paying attention 
like when not returning change in a restaurant [32]. When the incentive to lie is strong 
enough, the observability of deception does not prevent people to lie even in front of their 
victim [33], which may be reinforced by the fact that people dislike denouncing cheaters [34]. 
It has also been found that people with social preferences are more likely to tell black lies 
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when they feel they have been treated unfairly in the past [35].  
The role of social preferences is also complex when lies help others, creating a moral 
dilemma for people with lying aversion. On the one hand, oxytocin has been shown to 
promote group-serving dishonesty [36], and a fraction of individuals are willing to tell 
altruistic white lies, i.e. lies that help others but require a personal sacrifice [37]. On the other 
hand, in [37] Erat and Gneezy show that a large fraction of people, regardless of their social 
preferences, are not willing to tell even Pareto white lies, i.e. lies that increase the payoff of 
both players.  
If many people dislike lying when it reduces others’ wellbeing, there is also ample 
evidence of strategic exploitation of asymmetries of information. This is the case on markets 
for credence goods for which sellers are better informed than buyers on the true quality of the 
goods, even ex post, like in medical or judicial services, car or computer repair. In a field 
experiment on taxi rides [38], Balafoutas, Beck, Kerschbamer and Sutter manipulate the 
degree of presumed familiarity of clients on the ride and find longer detours and undue extra-
charges when the client seems to be less informed. Overtreatment and overcharging have been 
found also with car mechanics [39]. The abuse of hierarchical positions in social interactions 
is another source of unethical behavior, notably through biased evaluation of employees [40].  
People develop strategies to reconcile the exploitation of enrichment opportunities with 
the protection of their self-concept of honesty in a social environment. They can evade 
culpability by delegating the responsibility to an agent [41]. Delegation of lying is even more 
likely when the lie harms a victim to a greater extent [42]. Keeping a good image of oneself 
when cheating may also be easier when one exploits the moral wiggle room by remaining 
strategically ignorant about potential bad consequences of own actions for others. Remaining 
strategically ignorant not only helps to preserve a better self-concept but might even deflect 
punishment when interacting with others [43,44]. Interestingly, people seem to shy away from 
exploiting the moral wiggle room when they feel obliged to reciprocate [45]. In ultimatum 
games where the proposer has private information about the pie size there are differences in 
explicit and implicit deception. When the private information can be misrepresented through 
untruthful statements (explicit deception) or through information-revealing actions (implicit 
deception) it is found that requiring informed parties to make an explicit statement yields 
greater deception than when information is communicated implicitly [46].   
Deception might also be easier when one can persuade oneself that peers would lie in the 
same circumstances. Asymmetric peer effects have indeed been identified notably in the 
domain of tax evasion. Consistent with the “broken windows effect”, a bad example from 
others has a stronger impact on compliance than a good example [47]. Dishonesty is indeed 
contagious and the permeability of behavior could explain that some groups are characterized 
by a high degree of honesty and others by prevalent dishonesty [48,49]. 
 
How rules and institutions influence unethical behavior  
 
Dishonesty is not observed at the same degree across environments. Indeed, morals are also 
shaped by institutions, cultures and incentives. 
If people tend to stretch the truth and thus their moral responsibility, then institutional 
policy interventions reducing the moral wiggle room might be successful. One policy 
intervention is monitoring regulation. The opportunity to avoid being submitted to regulations 
increases unethical conduct compared to situations in which regulation is either exogenously 
imposed or entirely absent [24]. A field experiment on selling newspapers on the street shows 
that the intensive margin of customers’ honesty is positively impacted by a moral appeal for 
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honesty but not by a legal reminder [50] . The effectiveness of moral suasion is also 
documented in [51]. This confirms the importance of internalized moral norms. 
Market interactions are suspected to erode moral values. In [52] Falk and Szech report 
the results of an experiment in which individuals could either earn money and let a laboratory 
mouse be sacrificed, or renounce the money for saving the mouse’s life. In bilateral and 
multilateral double auction market institutions sellers and buyers could bargain to determine 
the price of the trade between life and money. They could alternatively decide not to bargain 
and save the mouse’s life. It turns out that with market institutions, a much higher percentage 
of subjects are willing to trade for prices below or equal to the fixed earnings. This higher 
willingness to kill in market interactions seems to indicate that markets erode moral values. 
This may result from social learning of prevailing norms through market interactions, a 
stronger focus on materialistic values, or the dilution of individual responsibility. 
Markets should, however, not be associated unconditionally with moral decay. The 
success of socially responsible products shows that a fraction of people are willing to pay a 
higher price in exchange for a reduction of negative externalities, and this resists to 
competitive pressure. But markets are embedded in cultures. With a comparison between 
China and Switzerland, in [53] Bartling, Weber and Yao show that if individuals from various 
cultures may derive the same utility from reducing negative externalities in a non-market 
context, market participants vary a lot in their willingness to internalize the social costs of 
trading activities. It is therefore the combination of market exchanges and culture that may 
crowd-out moral values, some cultures favoring high moral values, others not. 
Indeed, if market exchanges put more emphasis on materialistic values, culture may 
either strengthen or weaken moral values. Priming participants in a market context increases 
the proportion of lies, albeit not significantly so [54]. Priming business culture favors 
dishonesty in the banking industry [55]. While bankers behaved as honestly as other players 
in a control condition, making their professional identity more salient increased their 
dishonesty. Similar priming or increased money salience did not trigger dishonesty in other 
occupations. A dual process is probably at work: a dishonest business culture may lead 
individuals to adopt morally weak norms because of de-individualization; but a weak culture 
may also let individual misconduct permeate organizations through social interactions [56]. 
Culture, however, does not affect all organizational members the same. When personal ethical 
opinions do not match group norms, this mismatch can correlate with job dissatisfaction and 
lying [57].  
Professional cultures are also shaped by systems of incentives, some of them crowding in 
and others crowding out honesty. Introducing asymmetric liability where bribe-takers are 
culpable but bribe-givers have legal immunity reduces corrupt practices [58]. When prizes are 
assigned based on competitors’ relative performance, increasing the spread between the 
winner’s and the loser’s prizes encourages misconduct [59]. Not only competitive rewards 
increase dishonesty in comparison with individual rewards [60], more dishonest people are 
also more likely to self-select in competitive environments where deception is possible [61]. 
Note that other types of incentives, based for example on team rewards, are not dishonesty 
immune [62,63,64,65]. And competition needs not involve monetary rewards to generate 
dishonesty: even fixed rewards may encourage misconduct if individuals are willing to 
compete for rank and status [66], and people cheat for prestige incentives [67]. In contrast, 
shifting subjects’ attention from money (or perhaps performance) into time reduces cheating 
[68], which is consistent with both findings that time matters in honesty because self-serving 
behavior tends to be automatic [69], and that dishonesty is reduced when rewards from lying 
are delayed [70]. 
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Conclusion 
 
The literature on dishonesty has bloomed in recent years. Following psychologists but starting 
from a different perspective of standard models of rational cheating, economists have 
produced substantial experimental evidence on (dis-)honesty. The literature in economics and 
psychology has confirmed that even when there is (almost) no risk of detection, lying is 
incomplete and not universal, revealing the heterogeneity of moral costs and rejecting the 
simplistic standard economics-of-crime model.  
The more specific dimensions of recent economic research are twofold. First, if moral 
costs interact with the extrinsic benefit of cheating, in strategic interactions this relationship is 
affected by the existence of pro- and anti-social preferences, concerns for status and norms, 
and asymmetric information. Second, the economic analysis of unethical behavior emphasizes 
the importance of institutions and incentives on the individuals’ propensity to cheat, with 
certain rules or organizational modes more likely than others to bend moral firmness. 
These findings open new challenges. One is producing alternative theoretical models of 
(un-)ethical behavior [71]. Another one is deriving policy implications to design more 
efficient rules and incentives to combat unethical behavior. This includes reflections on how 
to nudge people so that they prefer keeping a good image of themselves rather than trading off 
a small monetary benefit for a bigger loss of self-concept. Another major challenge is 
building a behavioral ethics approach able to bridge and fertilize knowledge from psychology, 
economics, neuroeconomics (see [72] on pupil dilation, [73] on hormones or [29] on emotions 
on cheating), and other social sciences. 
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